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Abstract
Fairness considerations are a strong motivational force in social decision-making. Here, we investigated the role of
intentionality in response to unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game by manipulating both proposers’ degree of control over
the selection of offers and the context pertaining to the outcomes of offers proposers can choose from. As a result, the
design enabled us to disentangle intention- and context-based decision-making processes. Rejection rates were higher
when an unfair offer was intentionally chosen over a fair alternative than when it was chosen by the computer, outside
proposers’ control. This finding provides direct evidence for intention-based decision-making. Also, rejection rates in
general were sensitive to the context in which an offer was made, indicating the involvement of both intention- and
context-based processes in social decision-making. Importantly, however, the current study highlights the role of intention-
based fairness considerations in basic decision-making situations where outcomes are explicitly stated and thus easy to
compare. Based on these results, we propose that fairness can be judged on different, but additive levels of (social-)
cognitive processing that might have different developmental trajectories.
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Introduction
Fairness considerations, i.e. comparisons of self-interest and
other-interest, are a strong motivational force in social decision-
making. Individuals tend to regard outcomes that sustain
normative expectations about fairness as most valuable [1].
Fairness norms prevail even in economic situations involving
anonymous parties [2] and often imply a preference for an equal
distribution of resources, i.e. inequity aversion [3,4]. This process
of social comparison is also assumed to be crucial for feelings of
injustice, jealousy or envy [5,6]. As many of our decisions are
made within social settings, fairness intention models suggest that
the intention of the interaction partner is crucial in fairness
considerations [7]. Individuals show, for example, a greater desire
to sanction intended unfair offers compared to unintended unfair
offers in an economic game [8].
Perspective-taking is essential for evaluating others’ intentions.
Falk et al. [9] developed a modified version of the Ultimatum
Game (UG) [10] to examine the role of intentionality in fairness
considerations. In this version, the first player (proposer) chooses
from a fixed set of two distributions of the stake (here 10 coins),
which allows for manipulating the reference point of an offer. An
unfair offer of 8 coins for the proposer and 2 coins for the
responder (8:2) is paired with four different alternatives: a fair-
(5:5), a hyperfair- (2:8), a hyperunfair- (10:0), and no-alternative
(8:2). Pairing an unfair offer (8:2) with a fair alternative (5:5) can be
seen as an explicit version of the classic UG in which decision-
making is usually driven by comparing an offer to a potential equal
split, although this fairness norm remains implicit in the design.
Previous studies using the modified UG paradigm have revealed
that responders’ behavior is sensitive to the alternative options.
Rejection rates are highest when there is a fair-alternative, but
lowest when paired with a hyperunfair- or no-alternative
[9,11,12]. This suggests that fairness is not only evaluated based
on the actual distribution, but also with regard to the alternatives
to a given offer [13,14,15]. The authors [9,11,12] attributed
higher rejection rates of unfair offers in the fair-alternative
condition than in the no-alternative condition to intentionality
considerations and perspective-taking and termed this ‘context
effect’ [11,16]. Therefore, throughout this paper the term
‘‘context’’ will refer to the manipulation of alternative offers, i.e.
the unselected alternatives to an unfair offer. Further, it was
assumed that the no-alternative condition implies that proposers
make an unintended unfair offer because the two identical
distributions do not permit a real choice so that neither ‘good’
nor ‘bad’ intentions could be inferred.
Alternatively, however, the difference in rejection rates across
conditions (i.e. context effect) can be ascribed to comparing
outcomes for the self in the proposed offer and the alternative
distribution. In other words, the rejection decision may be based
on the comparison of the possible gain for oneself (i.e. 2 coins in
the 8:2-distribution) and the alternative, but by now unattainable
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distributional concerns may lie at the heart of the context effect,
which would be a more parsimonious explanation for the rejection
pattern previously reported. Varying the reference point of an
offer, i.e. the unchosen alternative, and thereby eliciting changes in
responder behavior, does not necessarily have to involve
perspective-taking or intentionality considerations, but has often
been taken as an indication of these higher-order social processes
[9,11,12,15,17]. Brandts & Sola ` [14] highlight that attributing
intentions essentially requires non-outcome information, i.e.
information that surpass a simple comparison of outcomes, and
Sandbu [13] even claims that the context effect as such ‘‘reveals
nothing about intentions.’’ Put differently, rejecting an unfair offer
because it was of less value than the alternative (i.e. ‘‘I can get 2
coins now, but I could have gotten 5 coins’’) can be anchored in
relatively straightforward outcome comparisons without consider-
ing other players’ perspective and their intentions.
In fact, a crucial factor in attributing intentions is proposers’
degree of control in making a choice [7]. Previous studies
[18,19,20,21] have usually tried to capture this aspect by
employing computer conditions in which participants play
economic games against a computer. However, these studies tend
to overlook an important aspect: When playing the UG against a
computer - an inanimate proposer neither emotionally nor
monetarily [18–20] affected by participants’ decisions - consider-
ing any potential other-interest becomes pointless. Effectively,
instead of depriving human proposers of their control over making
an offer, proposers are replaced by computers that neither possess
any sensitivity for fairness norms nor any authentic interest for the
outcome of the game. The social quality of the interaction missing,
it is not surprising that lower rejection rates of unfair offers from
computers than from human proposers are reported. Remarkably,
the study by Blount [21] is the only one in an UG setting in which
participants’ decisions actually had consequences for proposers’
payoff, irrespective of who was in control of making an offer (a
random device, a neutral third party or the other players
themselves). When participants had to indicate the lowest amount
that they would accept, a lower benchmark was set for offers
generated by a random device than for offers determined by the
other players themselves, which resembles the results from studies
using computer conditions [18–20].
Unfortunately, the classic UG used in these experiments [18–
21] is - due to its lack of an explicit reference point - not a suitable
design to capture the sensitivity to contextual fairness. Conversely,
the modified version of the UG [9,11,12] allows for varying the
context of an offer. The no-alternative condition even implies that
proposers have no actual choice in making an offer as the two
options are equally unfair. Yet, the two factors of control and
context comparisons of possible gains are confounded in this
condition as an unfair offer involves both no-control over the offer
and identical outcomes in the actual and alternative offer. In none
of the existing designs [9,11,12,15,17] intentionality is treated as a
separate factor that provides information going beyond available
and alternative payoffs. Although some authors have proposed the
development of models that incorporate both intention- and
outcome-based fairness considerations [15,22], the majority of
experiments in both psychology and economics has focused on
manipulating either intentionality or the context in which an offer
occurs, i.e. the reference point. Put differently, replacing human
proposers with a computer in order to capture intentionality
neglects the influence of social comparisons [18–20]. On the other
hand, varying the alternatives to an offer is often assumed to imply
intentionality [9,11,12,15,17]. Yet, the latter design does not
experimentally disentangle intentionality from the context effects,
i.e. information about potential outcomes. Notably, no single study
exists which adequately, i.e. explicitly, manipulates both contex-
tual fairness and intentionality in an UG setting. Using a closely
related game, the Dictator Game, in which the responder remains
passive without a choice to accept or reject [23], Houser & Xiao
[24], for instance, manipulate intentionality as well as context to
investigate punishment behavior. Their results show that punish-
ment is motivated by both inequality of the allocation and
intentionality of the dictator, but with increased punishment when
dictators themselves, instead of a computer, split the stake.
However, context is created in a rather dimensional approach as
dictators are presented with five different alternatives, ranging
from none to the dictator’s total endowment, so that there is
always a better or worse alternative. As this scope is likely to trigger
different perceptions of relative (un-)fairness than the binary choice
set of the modified UG, we remain cautious to directly compare
these two different designs.
The current study therefore aimed to investigate the relative
roles of intention- and context-based fairness considerations. To
accomplish this, we manipulated both the degree of control, i.e.
intentionality, and context, i.e. the alternative offer, using a
modified UG. Along with the context manipulations discussed
above, we also included no-control conditions in which the
computer takes over from the other player and randomly selects
one of the two options. Consequently, conditions were established
where the absolute payoff of a particular offer is the same, but it is
either selected by the human player (control condition) or by the
computer (no-control condition). For the control condition, we
expected to replicate the previously reported relation between
rejection rates and context as determined by the alternatives. For
offers outside of proposers’ control, we formulated two possible
hypotheses: If intentionality is the central determinant of
responders’ decisions, rejection rates for all no-control conditions
should be similar, irrespective of context. Moreover, these
rejection rates should not differ from the no-alternative control
condition because the same basic tendency for inequity aversion is
expected in all conditions where proposers have no real choice, i.e.
both in the no-alternative control and in all no-control conditions.
Alternatively, however, if fairness considerations based on the
comparison of gains in the actual and alternative offer are a central
determinant of responders’ decisions, the pattern of rejection rates
should be similar for control and no-control conditions.
Methods
Participants
Fifty subjects (25 male, 25 female) participated in the
experiment (M age=22.52 yrs, SD=5.43). All participants gave
written informed consent and the procedure was approved by the
local ethics committee (Ethische Commissie Gedragswetenschap-
pelijk Onderzoek of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Radboud
University Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
Design
Participants played the role of the responder in a computerized
version of the modified UG. There were two within-subject
factors: Control and Context. Control had two levels based on who
selects the offer for the proposer: the human player him/herself
(control) or the computer (no-control). The factor of control
captures thus whether an offer was intended or not. Context had
four levels based on alternatives to an unfair distribution (8:2): a
fair-alternative (5:5 vs. 8:2), a hyperfair-alternative (2:8 vs. 8:2), a
hyperunfair-alternative (10:0 vs. 8:2), and no-alternative (8:2 vs.
8:2). Hence, the factor context pertains to the alternative outcome
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presented 16 times each (counterbalanced for proposers’ gender
and position of the unfair offer). As the no-alternative condition
entails an 8:2 offer for either alternative, an unfair offer (8:2) was
presented in 5 of the 8 conditions, equivalent to 80 trials. The
three genuine alternative offers (i.e., 5:5, 2:8 or 10:0) were selected
on 48 trials, yielding 128 trials in total. Contrary to subjects’ belief,
all choices were computer-generated.
Material
Figure 1 depicts the timeline of a trial in both fair-alternative
conditions. Each round started with a fixation cross (1000 ms),
followed by the presentation of the two available options
(1000 ms). Next, the selected offer was surrounded by a red
square (1000 ms). Subsequently, ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’ buttons were
presented while the selection remained visible. As the task was self-
paced, participants had unlimited amount of time to respond via
pressing one of two buttons using the keyboard. Participants’
response remained on the screen for 2000 ms before the next
round started.
Procedure
Participants were led to believe that they were coupled with data
from subjects who had previously participated as proposers and
that they would play every round with a new partner. They were
told that on some trials the other players would make an offer
themselves and on other trials the computer would randomly select
one of the two options. Participants’ task was to decide whether to
accept or reject an offer. If accepted, the coins were distributed as
proposed; if rejected, neither player received anything. Partici-
pants were informed that at the end of the experiment, a random
number of rounds would be selected to determine their payoff.
This was done to assure participants’ motivation and to strengthen
the concept of a one-shot game as every round could influence
their financial outcome. Moreover, it was emphasized that
participants’ decisions also affected the other players’ outcome
because their payoff would be determined by participants’
response, irrespective of who made the proposal in a particular
round (i.e. themselves vs. computer). Proposers would be paid after
all data from responders had been collected. The payoff was set
around 2.50 Euro to manage an equal payment for all
participants, resulting in 10 Euro compensation.
Results
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the rejection
rate of unfair offers with control (two levels: human vs. computer)
and context (four levels: fair vs. hyperfair vs. hyperunfair vs. no
alternative) as within-subject factors. There was a main effect of
control, F (1, 49)=4.60, p,.05, g
2=.09, indicating that rejection
rates were highest when proposers’ decisions were under their full
Figure 1. Display of a trial in the fair-alternative condition (top: control, bottom: no-control condition). The left part of the screen
shows the name of the proposer at the top (here ‘‘Proposer’’) and the name of the participant underneath (here ‘‘You’’). In the no-control condition,
the otherwise black silhouette of the proposer was purple with a banner displaying ‘‘Computer chooses’’. The same banner was also displayed
instead of the proposer’s name. The two potential distributions are specified by red and blue coins (red for proposer, blue for responder). The offer
selected by the proposer was encircled in red. The participant has to decide whether to accept (‘‘Yes’’) or reject (‘‘No’’) the offer via button press.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031491.g001
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selected the offer (30.5%). Moreover, there was a main effect of
context, F (3, 147)=23.72, p,.001, g
2=.33 (see Figure 2).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni correction)
revealed that rejection rates were highest for the fair-alternative
condition (47.3%) compared to the other alternatives (hyperfair:
39.3%, p,.05; hyperunfair: 18.6%, p,.001; no-alternative:
22.3%, p,.001). Rejection rates for the hyperfair alternative
condition were higher than for the hyperunfair and no-alternative
condition (both ps,.001). The latter two did not differ significantly
(p=1).
Importantly, the interaction between context and control was
significant, F (3, 147)=5.80, p,.01, g
2=.11. Further analyses
demonstrated that this was due to the fair-alternative condition.
Rejection rates were significantly higher in this condition when
the proposal was made under proposers’ full control (52.0%)
than when the computer selected the offer (42.5%; t(49)=3.10,
p,.01).
For the alternative offers, i.e. for trials on which not the 8:2, but
the alternative distribution was chosen, hyperunfair offers were
nearly always rejected (87.1%), whereas fair (5.1%) as well as
hyperfair offers (2.5%) were nearly always accepted. This shows
that the presence of basic fairness evaluations among participants
can be assumed. There were no sex differences (all ps..48).
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate the relative roles
of intention- and context-based fairness considerations that drive
social decision-making. Based on influential factors identified in
earlier research [7], we manipulated (1) control, i.e. intentionality,
as assessed by whether proposers themselves or the computer
selected the offer, and (2) context, i.e., the outcome of the
alternative in the modified UG.
An effect of control was evident when an unfair treatment was
made explicit, namely when an unfair offer was paired with a fair
alternative. Faced with a fair alternative, participants rejected
unfair offers more often when the offer was selected by proposers
themselves than when selected by the computer. In this specific
situation, proposers’ intentional deviation from the social norm of
fairness was most salient. This finding thus provides direct
evidence for intention-based decision-making processes in fairness
considerations. When presuming that the situation in the classic
UG most resembles the fair-alternative condition in the current
design, our findings are technically in line with previous studies
[18–21] reporting lower rejection rates of unfair offers from
computers than from human proposers. However, one should bear
in mind that the classic UG lacks an explicit reference point and is
therefore not able to capture context effects and their potential
Figure 2. Rejection rates of unfair offers with regard to alternative offers and control of the choice. Mean percentage and standard
errors of rejection of 8:2-offers are displayed. Significant differences between control and no-control conditions are indicated by an asterisk(*), p,.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031491.g002
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against a computer, responders’ decisions usually do not have
consequences for another player [18–20].
Responder behavior in conditions where proposers have full
control over choosing an offer are in line with earlier studies
investigating context effects [9,11,12]. Unfair offers were more
often rejected when the alternative was fair compared to a
hyperfair-, hyperunfair- or no-alternative. Moreover, the no-
control conditions depicted a similar pattern of results as the
control conditions, indicating that unfair offers were more often
rejected when paired with a better (i.e. fair- or hyperfair-)
alternative, even when the decision was not under proposers’
control and clearly made unintentionally.
Taken together, the current results show that fairness consid-
erations are sensitive to both intentionality and context. Compar-
ing outcomes of the actual and the alternative offer remains an
integral part of fairness evaluations even when the offers are
beyond proposers’ control. Importantly, however, intentionality
becomes crucial when the unfair treatment is obvious: When
proposers clearly choose not to offer an equal split by favoring an
unfair distribution, the intentional social norm violation is instantly
and unambiguously recognizable. Participants’ increased tendency
to reject these unfair offers can be regarded as a form of altruistic
punishment – punishing proposers for the norm violation at a cost
to themselves [25].
Previous studies have shown that altruistic punishment occurs
frequently even in one-shot encounters, hence in absence of direct
reciprocity or reputation formation [26]. It may be triggered by
negative emotions like anger [20,27] and is often used in order to
reduce inequality [28,29]. The current study shows that when
confronted with two alternatives where one is strictly fair and the
other undoubtedly unfair, the desire for compliance with fairness
norms is most evident as participants were least willing to accept
an intentional unfair offer. These results corroborate a study by
Nelissen et al. [30] in which responders had an outside option that
yielded a larger personal payoff when rejecting than when
accepting an equal split. The majority of responders decided on
behalf of an equal split, thus missing an additional monetary
benefit. The preference for fairness norms overrules the motive of
maximizing personal payoff, verifying that fairness is a normal
good [4]. Despite a greater punishment tendency in response to
intentional unfairness, altruistic punishment also occurs when the
source of inequality is random, i.e. unintentional [8,24],
supporting the importance of egalitarian motives [28].
Although the strict and mutually exclusive differentiation
between intention-based and outcome-based fairness seems to
prevail in the literature [7,29,30,31,32], some authors have
already expressed the need for models that include both intention-
and outcome-based fairness considerations [15,22]. Since our data
suggest a broader perspective on fairness dimensions, we would
like to propose a new framework that integrates key factors
identified previously [7] as well as (social-)cognitive demands that
accompany each level of fairness considerations.
In this new framework, outcome-based fairness considerations
comprise the first and basic level of social decision-making. It is
anchored in social comparison processes, that is, a comparison of
outcomes of the self and the other. On this level, the concept of
fairness primarily refers to an equal split, which is a very salient
signal. A preference for an equal split - also referred to as inequity
aversion - is already observable in young children [33,34] and
non-human species like capuchins, chimpanzees and domesticated
dogs [35]. Experimental paradigms investigating this level usually
involve the division of resources, as in the UG. Note that the
context effects observed here and previously [9,11–14,17] exceed
pure inequity aversion. As the magnitude of an offer, i.e. its
absolute payoff for the self and the other, remains identical across
contexts and degrees of control, objective fairness is violated in all
unfair offers.
Taking into account the context in which an offer occurs
characterizes the next level of fairness considerations. Here,
additional information about the unchosen alternative has to be
processed and integrated. This requires counterfactual thinking,
i.e. mental representations of alternatives to past events [36] that,
in this case, involve both the self and the other. Thinking about
hypothetical events has been linked to executive functioning,
especially working memory and inhibitory control [37]. Apart
from engaging additional cognitive competencies, this level is likely
to also pose more demands on mentalizing skills as chimpanzees
and children do not show context effects in a modified UG
[11,12,38]. The sensitivity to contextual fairness seems to go in
hand with maturation in adolescence and seems to play an
increasingly significant role in the decision-making process. Yet,
the phenomenon of inequity aversion does not utterly disappear as
rejection rates in the no-alternative conditions do not drop to zero,
but remain substantial [9,11,12]. Hence, the rejection rate in the
no-alternative conditions might reflect a basic tendency for
inequity aversion [9,17] that continues to exert influence on
decision-making.
Intentionality can be viewed as the next level in fairness
considerations. Judging whether observed behavior was intention-
al is crucial in social interactions as it may lead to different
perceptions of responsibility and morality [39,40]. In criminal law,
for instance, intentionality comprises, apart from the voluntary
element, also a cognitive facet, namely whether someone was
aware of the probable consequences of an action. It is therefore
often linked with outcome information and not regarded in
isolation, as fairness intention models seem to suggest [7]. Our
results support the notion that intentionality does not completely
override the conclusions derived from previous levels as both the
preference for equitable outcomes, i.e. a basic tendency for
inequity aversion, as well as the sensitivity to contextual fairness
remain. When an unfair treatment is explicit and salient,
intentionality moderates context-based preferences. For future
studies, it would be interesting to assess developmental changes
that might complement the shift towards this level of decision-
making.
These additive levels correspond to an increasing amount of
information that is considered and integrated before a decision is
made. Note that - unlike more complex everyday life situations - in
the current task, all potential consequences are explicitly stated
and can easily be compared using the same ‘currency’ (i.e. coins).
In contrast, decoding and understanding intentions in real-life
interactions is usually more complex and requires additional
abilities, such as perspective-taking or mentalizing processes
[41,42] known to continue developing in humans until late
adolescence [11]. The development of these different factors
throughout adolescence is intriguing and should be explored in
more detail.
Further research should be devoted to altered social decision-
making that is frequently observed in clinical populations.
Impairments in social decision-making have been associated with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) malfunction in e.g. lesion
patients and patients with psychopathy or depression [43,44,45]
and might be linked with specific processing deficits at one of these
levels of fairness considerations. The use of sensitive methods such
as eye-tracking could provide insight in the fixation patterns of
both patient and healthy populations, e.g. the amount of time
spent looking at the actual vs. the alternative offer and how this
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features. The inclusion of additional conditions with, for instance,
equivalent absolute earnings, but differences in inequality (e.g. 2
coins for the responder being paired with 2 or 4 coins for the
proposer respectively) would be highly relevant in order to get a
better grip on the underlying mechanisms in future studies.
To conclude, the current study was the first to show that
intentionality moderates context-based preferences when an unfair
treatment is explicit and salient. However, outcome comparisons
of the options that had initially been available shape fairness
considerations even when unfairness was unintentional. Based on
these results, we propose that fairness can be judged on different
levels, which might have separate developmental trajectories.
Whereas focusing on salient outcomes might be a useful initial rule
of thumb, incorporating context-related information as well as
correctly attributing intentionality is necessary for the complex
social decision-making humans encounter in everyday life. In such
real-life situations, information about all possible outcomes is not
only sparse, but also highly complex and uncertain, yielding
elevated fairness considerations to be efficiently driven by
intention-based decision- making.
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